系统性金融风险的历史考察与防范对策

深入学习习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告，在考察20世纪以来的12次金融危机的基础上，对系统性金融风险发生的根源进行了研究，并结合我国当前系统性金融风险面临的形势，提出了防范系统性金融风险的对策建议。研究表明，将过去100多年引发金融危机的系统性金融风险的根源与我国当前的金融形势进行比较分析，可以发现我国面临的系统性金融风险形势十分严峻，必须在党的领导下，采取打击金融腐败、适当收紧货币政策、完善金融监管体系、维护币值稳定、加强金融科技监管等相关政策来防止系统金融风险的发生。     

Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms

This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions.     

新型监管政策下我国保险资金的资产配置研究——基于大类资产监管和“偿二代”的政策背景

近年来我国保险资金运用监管开始实行“放开前端、管住后端”的政策理念，在前端实行的是资产大类监管政策，在后端实行的是“偿二代”政策。在此新的政策背景下，保险公司如何优化投资结构是一项非常重要的问题。考虑到我国保险业实际监管政策内容，以投资组合的风险最低资本的最小化为优化目标，以大类监管政策中的投资比例限制为约束条件，建立了一个新的投资组合模型，用来计算出各种最优投资组合比例。研究结果表明：在新监管政策下，协议存款、基础设施和不动产的理论配置比例较高, 债券类投资和权益类投资的理论配置比例较低。与理论投资比例相，债券类产品的实际投资比例偏高，而不动产类投资品的实际投资比例偏低，所以我国保险资金在今后的大类资产配置中，应当降低债券的投资比例，适当提高不动产的投资比例。     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.     

Defining and Defending a Progressive Market Square: Bringing Institutionalist Development Discourse in Line with the Reality of Post-Soviet Transition Experiences

Abstract:

This article is a response to two crucial ideas about progressive institutional change: the first is J. Fagg Foster’s principle of “minimal social dislocation,” which asserts that socio-economic changes should be implemented gradually, to avoid unraveling the social fabric of the community; the second is Karl Polanyi’s principles of redistribution of rights and powers by relevant authorities and reciprocity, a symmetrical and highly personalized exchange system, which is likewise a protective mechanism that society employs against anonymity and disintegration brought about by unregulated market. Using lessons learned in the thirty-year transition to market in post-Soviet countries, this article argues that to commence progressive institutional change in the honesty- and transparency-resistant cultures of former Soviet states, impersonal exchange and impartial rule of law must be given far greater weight than personalization of contacts and continuation of cultural traditions.     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

When and how the psychologically entitled employees hide more knowledge?

The purpose of this study is to examine how psychological entitlement is associated with knowledge hiding behaviors and why some individuals, unlike others, indulge in more knowledge hiding behaviors because of entitlement tendency. Using a time lag study design, we collected data from 241 participants from hospitality sector of Pakistan. The results indicate that psychological entitlement is positively associated with knowledge hiding behaviors and this relationship is mediated by abusive supervision perceptions. Our results also show that hostile attribution bias strengthens the positive impact of psychological entitlement on abusive supervision perceptions. Moreover, the indirect effect of psychological entitlement on knowledge hiding behavior via abusive supervision perceptions is stronger for employees with high levels of hostile attribution bias than employees with low levels of hostile attribution bias.